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THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF RADICAL CHANGE:
HERBERT MARCUSE'S
"GREAT REFUSAL" VS.
POLITICAL DUE PROCESS*
WILLIAM A. STANMEYER * '
"I maintain that there are issues where . . . there is no 'other
side' .... .
-Herbert Marcuse
"All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility."
-John Stuart Mill
F FOR AMERICANS the past decade is historically recorded as the
Revolutionary Sixties, no small credit will be due to the now famous
neo-Hegelian philosopher, Herbert Marcuse.1 If that same decade gains
the paradoxical reputation as the era in which Americans enacted and
violated more laws than in any other decade in their history, a measure
of the credit-or blame-belongs to Professor Marcuse. Marcuse's
influence on the student racial movement and the academic world
* Reprinted from 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1 (1970).
** Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University. Litt. B., Xavier University,
1958; M.A., Loyola University, 1962; J.D., DePaul University, 1966. Appreciation
is expressed to second year law student Marylou Giacomuzzi for research assis-
tance in preparing this article.
1 Herbert Marcuse, now in his seventies, moved from his Berlin birthplace to Frei-
burg, where in 1922 he completed his formal studies of philosophy and aesthetics
and received his doctorate. After serving as Heidegger's assistant, he joined the
Frankfurt Institute of Social Research, where Fromm, Horkheimer, and others
were developing a neo-Marxist and Freudian critique of modern capitalism. Mar-
cuse came to the United States in 1932 and worked in various research institutes
until 1941, at which time he began a nine-year interlude with the Office of Strategic
Services and the Department of State. In 1954 he began teaching politics and phi-
losophy at Brandeis; presently he is a professor of philosophy at the University of
California at San Diego.
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is undeniable. 2 His major book 3 has
gone into seven printings in five years.
He has been explained, praised, and
denounced in popular journals both liberal4
and conservative, 5 intellectual 6 and busi-
ness. 7 Though hardly a "household word"
himself, Marcuse and his theories have
been invoked even to illumine the allegedly
darker aspects of the present Administra-
tion's attitude toward the media.8 For a
2 See, e.g., THE CRITICAL SPIRIT: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF HERBERT MARCUSE (K. Wolff & B.
Moore eds. 1967 [hereinafter Wolff & Moore.
However, for a view, sub silentio, different from
that expressed in the text, regarding his influence
on the radical student movement, see THE POL-
ITICS OF PROTEST (J. Skolnick ed. 1969), which
does not mention him in nearly fifty pages on
"Student Protest."
His influence in the academic world appears to
be rather uneven, depending on the political
orientation of a given college or department, the
age of its instructors, the number of "activists" on
campus, and other variables. That he should have
any noticeable influence at all strikes me as
somewhat puzzling, for he has written only one
significant work, i.e., ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN
(1964) [hereinafter ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN];
and the weaknesses of his arguments lay him
open to devastating critique. See, e.g., Howe, Her-
bert Marcuse or Milovan Djilas?, HARPER'S, July
1969, at 4; Vivas, Herbert Marcuse: 'Philosopher'
en titre of the New Nihilists, 6 INTER-COLLEGIATE
REV. 51 (1969). His influence may be due to the
fact that it is easier to quote him than to under-
stand him, and that apparently few of his devo-
tees have taken the time to read his critics.
3 ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN.
4 Callahan, Resistance and Technology, 87 CoM-
MONWEAL 377 (1967).
5 Glaser, Marcuse and tle German New Left,
20 NAT'L REV. 649 (1968).
6 Peretz, Herbert Marcuse: Beyond Technolog-
ical Reason, 57 YALE REV. 518 (1968). This is
the best article I have seen which is largely
sympathetic.
7 Kristol, The Inprobable Guru of Surrealistic
Politics, 80 FORTUNE, July 1969, at 191.
8 Greenfield, Spiro Agnew: Heresy in High
time student revolutionaries on the Conti-
nent revered him as the Second Person of
a new Trinity of radicalism. 9 Nevertheless,
it is fair to assert that outside certain very
narrow circles, his name is unknown and
his influence, if felt, is unrecognized. Per-
haps he is nowhere more unknown than in
the world of law, since the work of lawyers
as a class is ordinarily quite different from
that of the political theorist.' 0 Yet, because
Marcuse has influenced a generation of
nascent political activitists and social theo-
rists to adopt an outlook at odds with
traditional notions of law, the values law
protects, and the procedures requisite for
civilized change, those who inhabit the
legal world should scrutinize his ideas
closely. Ideas do have consequences.
The sections that follow will sketch Mar-
cuse's thought as drawn from his works"
that bear on this theme, in particular One-
Dimensional Man, his critique of modern
industrial society; An Essay on Libera-
tion,12 dealing with techniques of achieving
radical change; and Repressive Tolerance,
an essay from A Critique of Pure Toler-
ance.13 Through copious citations Marcuse
Places, The Washington Post, Nov. 22, 1969,
at A-18, col. 3.
9 One-Dimensional Philosopher, TIME, Mar. 22,
1968, at 38 [hereinafter One-Dimensional Philos-
opher]. See also Howe, supra note 2.
10 I have suggested elsewhere that lawyers as a
class, emerging from the British empirical tradi-
tion, are ill-equipped intellectually to cope with
movements whose elan resembles that of a con-
tinental ideology. See Stanmeyer, The New Left
and The Old Law, 55 A.B.A.J. 319 (1969).
11 A comprehensive bibliography of Marcuse's
works up to April 1, 1967, appears in Wolff &
Moore, at 427-33.
12 H. MARCUSE, AN ESSAY ON LIBERATION (1969)
[hereinafter LIBERATION].
13 Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in A CRITIQUE
will speak for himself whenever possible.
Although in any summary some nuances
are necessarily lost, the exposition will be
as accurate as possible. It should be under-
stood at the outset that I find the argu-
ments of Burke and Mills and their tradi-
tion far more convincing than Marcuse's
and that a vast gulf lies between them. I
will offer some criticisms of Marcuse from
the perspective of that tradition, for not
even a radical critic should be immune
from critical commentary.
Part I deals with Marcuse's general
position on (a) the repressive technologi-
cal society, (b) "liberation" through "ne-
gation" and "the Great Refusal," and (c)
the need for "repressive tolerance." Part
II offers an appreciation in (a) demonstrat-
ing the value of negative thinking and in
(b) some criticisms of his method. Finally,
Part III ponders the need for "rules of the
game" in political decision-making and
contrasts this kind of "due process" with
Marcuse's recommendation of violence.
The conclusion contains some comments
on bridging that vast gulf between the
evolutionary and the revolutionary.
The Repressive Technological Society
Central to Marcuse's thinking is the
view that contemporary technological so-
ciety-generally the West and specifically
the United States-is both totalitarian and
irrational. For "totalitarian" means not
only a terroristic political coordination of
society, but also a non-terroristic economic-
OF PURE TOLERANCE 81 (K. Wolff, B. Moore &
H. Marcuse eds. 1969) [hereinafter Repressive
Tolerance].
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technical coordination wherein vested in-
terests manipulate human needs and "thus
preclude[s] the emergence of an effective
opposition against the whole."' 14 More-
over, "this society is irrational as a
whole."' 5 Its productivity destroys free de-
velopment of human faculties and fulfill-
ment of human needs; its peace is main-
tained by the constant threat of war.
People suffer under "aggressive business
practices which turn ever more spaces of
protective nature into a medium of com-
mercial fulfillment and fun" and thus both
"offend beauty" and "repress biological
necessities.' 1 6 The individual in the af-
fluent society bends under "strains and
stresses ...grounded in the normal func-
tioning of this society . . . rather than in
its disturbances and diseases."'1 7 This so-
ciety is sick.' 8
The need for possessing, consuming, han-
dling, and constantly renewing the gadgets,
devices, instruments, engines, offered to and
imposed upon the people, for using these
wares even at the danger of one's own
destruction, has become a "biological"
need.' 9
"The established universe of discourse is
14 ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 3.
15 Id. at ix.
16 H. MARCUSE, NEGATIONS: ESSAYS IN CRIT-
ICAL THEORY 267 (1968) [hereinafter NEGATIONS].
17 Id. at 249.
Is As a tentative definition of "sick society" we
can say that a society is sick when its basic
institutions and relations, its structure, are
such that they do not permit the use of the
available material and intellectual resources
for the optimal development and satisfaction
of individuals needs.
Id. at 251.
19 LBERATION 11.
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that of an unfree world"; 20 one experiences
a "radical falsity [in] the established forms
of life."'21 By apparently providing for
man's every want, society has deadened his
critical faculties: "the increasing comforts
of life and the ubiquitous power of the
productive apparatus keep man enslaved to
the prevailing state of affairs." '22 We in-
habit a society which is both totally ad-
ministered and overdeveloped, which
creates artificial waste in order to maintain
specious affluence, which fosters "positive
thinking" not through terror but by over-
whelming, anonymous power and effi-
ciency.23 In flattening opposition, in ab-
sorbing the Other, the media as well engage
in maintaining the "one-dimensional" so-
ciety: they stifle the mind's quest for alter-
natives and help make liberty itself an
instrument of domination. "Free election
of masters does not abolish the masters or
the slaves." 24
20 H. MARCUSE, REASON AND REVOLUTION:
HEGEL AND THE RISE OF SOCIAL THEORY Xii
(1960) [hereinafter REASON AND REVOLUTION].
21 Id. at xiii.
22 Id. at xiv. Cf. ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 8,
noting the "flattening out of the contrast (or
conflict) between the given and the possible, be-
tween the satisfied and the unsatisfied needs."
23 ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 226. "Positive think-
ing" has a technical meaning. It has overtones of
philosophical positivism, which Marcuse strongly
opposes and forcefully criticizes. See id. at 144-69.
He sees it as basically a philosophical movement
"which undertook to subordinate reason to the
authority of established fact." REASON AND REVO-
LUTION xv. This attitude leads to an uncritical
acceptance of the status quo and a blindness to
the possibilities of alternatives. See also NEGA-
TIONS 134-58.
24 ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 7. The "absorption
of the negative by the 'positive'" is discussed at
226 et seq.
Other commentators have gleaned essentially
Many of these value-laden sociological
judgments have been suggested before.2 5
the same message. Martin Peretz, supra note 6,
summarizes as follows:
Business and labor, advertiser and consumer,
each has a stake in the perpetuation of the
present. How pointless then, the old philo-
sophic gambits of is and ought, of being and
becoming! What Marcuse finds so striking and
so compromising are the equivalent implica-
tions of other intellectual disciplines. Sociol-
ogy studies the conditions securing consensus;
psychology probes for refined techniques of
inducing adjustment; economics purports to be
neutral engineering; the arts are smugly de-
void of ennobling aspiration. . . . [T]he guilt
of the intellectuals [consists of] envisioning no
alternatives to the present ...
Id. at 522. And he adds that
poverty amidst plenty, elaborately preserved
formal liberties carefully emptied of substance,
an ethic of work undermining the free leisure
momentum of automation, an economy of
waste and obsolescence, the recurrence of wars
and of military interventions, these are not for
him [Marcuse] blemishes on the facade of the
system gradually to be eliminated with time;
they are of the system's essence and in keeping
with its logic.
Id. at 523.
See also Cohen, The Norman Vincent Peale of
the Left, ATLANTIC, June 1969, at 108; Howe,
supra note 2; Vivas, supra note 2. The flippant
titles given to some popular articles on Marcuse
should not be allowed to obscure the seriousness
with which he writes and his devotees follow
him. For a serious appraisal, see Stern, The Meta-
physics of Rebellion, 6 RAMPARTS 55 (1967).
25 Marcuse himself acknowledges his debt to C.
Wright Mills, Vance Packard, William H. Whyte,
and Fred J. Cook. ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 17.
He adds a theoretical analysis. His merger of
Hegel with popularized sociology has been noted
in Stillman, Marcuse, HORIZON, Summer 1969,
at 26. After naming the forementioned writers:
"Marcuse is the reverse of a popularizer-one
who makes abstruse thinking accessible to the
masses. Marcuse takes popular doctrine and
cloaks it in ideology and dense prose." Id. at 31.
Despite this jibe, this article is the best serious
piece that I have seen in the popular press which
Marcuse's originality lies partly in his at-
tempt to cast them into a mold drawn from
Hegel, Marx and Freud; and largely in his
candid appraisal of what must be done
about them. The latter point bears directly
on an area of inquiry where jurisprudence
and social philosophy overlap: the role of
law in organizing a humane society.2 6
Implicit through Marcuse's diagnosis of
society is a view of law. For him, law is
an instrument of the hyper-stable society
itself, a means of preserving the status quo
and cloaking its resistance to change in
the garb of legitimacy. In this view he de-
parts little from Marx, whose remark about
bourgeois jurisprudence 27 expressed the
doctrine that all subsequent revolutionaries
marching under his banner have preached.
Though not in overall outlook, Marcuse
has moved away from Marx in significant
details, both in his unhesitant admission
that no longer is a single "class," the
bourgeoisie, at fault-he substitutes the
technological organization as a whole, in
which the workers acquiesce as well-and
shows the philosophical, historical and even
theological influences on Marcuse.
26 Consider the relation of his book, Eros and
Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud,
written in 1955, to its "Political Preface," writ-
ten in 1966.
27 But don't wrangle with us so long as you ap-
ply, to our intended abolition of bourgeois
property, the standard of your bourgeois no-
tions of freedom, culture, law, etc. Your very
ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions
of your bourgeois production and bourgeois
property, just as your jurisprudence is but the
will of your class made into a law for all, a
will, whose essential character and direction
are determined by the economic conditions of
existence of your class.
K. MARX, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 47 (Gate-
way ed. 1965) (emphasis added).
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in his conviction that radical new begin-
nings must occur equally in such hitherto
politically irrelevant fields as linguistics
and general culture. 25 Marcuse sees little
that is truly liberating in the present role
of law in our lives (and here too he may
be influenced by the Marxian postulate
that ultimately, after the purgative period
of proletarian dictatorship, the State and
its laws will "wither away"); indeed, he
would probably regard law and "libera-
tion" as antithetical. It is hardly strange,
therefore, that he recommends actions
which depart from the law-imposed
norms.2 9 To see why such departure is a
means to liberation, one must understand
the premise: liberation, the goal of social
life, means the fulfillment of individual de-
sires and potentiality as autonomously ar-
ticulated. However, law helps impose that
crushing cultural uniformity which inhibits
autonomous choice; thus law contributes
to the withering of freedom.
At the very outset of One-Dimensional
Man Marcuse suggests a startling notion
of freedom: "The rights and liberties
which were such vital factors in the origins
and earlier stages of industrial society yield
to a higher stage of this society: they are
losing their traditional rationale and con-
tent. '30 Freedom of thought, speech and
conscience were "essentially critical ideas,
designed to replace an obsolescent material
and intellectual culture by a more produc-
28 Cf. A Biological Foundation for Socialism?,
in LIBERATION 8-20, & 73.
29 Id. at 67-73. See also Repressive Tolerance at
81. The entire essay is an exhortation to depart
from traditional norms, especially of freedom of
speech.
30 ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 1.
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tive and rational one." But now that they
are institutionalized, they have lost their
critical thrust. 1 It follows that to achieve
"a radical transvaluation of values" 32 the
present forms of freedom must be negated;
in fact, the only way to achieve true libera-
tion from the false consciousness that so
permeates our society is "total rejection
of the existing society, of its entire value
system. ' " 0 The popular majority's opinion
is generated by the dominant interests in
the status quo; consequently "the general
will is always wrong"; 34 and "if democracy
means self-government of free people, with
justice for all, then the realization of
democracy would presuppose abolition of
the existing pseudo-democracy." 35 The op-
31 The problem of the fossilization of revolu-
tionary fervor once it becomes "established" may
be more a fact of human psychology than an
attribute of an idea, such as freedom. The sec-
ularization of the Christian Church, once Em-
peror Constantine made it the Roman Empire's
official religion, is perhaps one historical example.
Milovan Djilas has observed the same phenom-
enon infecting the communist movement. M.
DJILAS, THE NEW CLASS 152 (Praeger ed. 1964).
32 LIBERATION 6. "Such a practice involves a
break with the familiar, the routine ways of see-
ing, hearing, feeling, understanding things ....
Id. "To the degree to which the rebellion is di-
rected against a functioning, prosperous, 'demo-
cratic' society, it is a moral rebellion, against the
hypocritical, aggressive values and goals . . .
of this society .... " Id. at 62.
33 Id. at 58. He describes "today's rebels" who
have "libertarian aspirations" which "appear as
the negation of the traditional culture...." Id.
at 46. Earlier, he describes with the fervor of the
advocate, the "struggle . . . waged for essen-
tially new ways and forms of life: negation of
the entire Establishment, its morality, culture.
Id. at 25.
34 Id. at 65. The general will is wrong because "it
objectively counteracts the possible transforma-
tion of society into more humane ways of life."
35 Id.
position that must arise cannot share the
same premises of this system or be willing
to work for piecemeal reform, for then it
too would finally be co-opted and absorbed
into the one-dimensional society; rather,
what is needed is "an opposition which is
directed, not against a particular form of
government or against particular condi-
tions within society, but against a given
social system as a whole .... "36 He de-
velops the preconditions for this opposition
in An Essay on Liberation.
"The Great Refusal": Liberation
Through Negation
In discussing "the present meaning of
Liberalism," George H. Sabine states that
"a crucial characteristic and perhaps the
most important characteristic of a liberal
government is the negative quality of not
being totalitarian, '" 3 7 and that its goal is
"first and foremost ... to regularize public
reflection and discussion, and the weighing
of contrary claims to the end of evolving a
workable policy."38 This is done, he as-
serts, by institutions which promote a
maximum of opportunity for human wis-
dom, which "consists less in certainty than
in a built-in corrigibility. '"3 9 And when
Mill inquires what accounts for the fact
that most people hold rational opinions and
exhibit rational conduct, he answers that
"it is owing to a quality of the human mind
3 Id. at 66. For a discussion of the implications
of acting "against a given social system as a
whole," see text accompanying notes 46-57 infra.
37 G. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY
751 (3d ed. 1962).
38 Id. at 752.
39 Id. at 753.
... that as a moral being, [a man's] errors
are corrigible. '40
It is precisely these two features which
Marcuse vehemently denies exist in modern
society; for it is totalitarian-and thus it
is no longer corrigible. 41 Therefore non-
parliamentary means must be utilized; in
sum, these comprise the Great Refusal.4 2
He teaches that the resistance must take
place in life style, in language, in action;
that to create "a realm of freedom which
is not that of the present . . . necessitates
an historical break with the past and pres-
ent."'43 He believes that a rational organiza-
tion of the technical and technological
forces of advanced capitalism and socialism
"would terminate poverty and scarcity
within a very foreseeable future, ' 44 but
only if the rebellion takes root in the very
nature of the individual man and a qualita-
tive change occurs in the needs-in the
"infrastructure," as it were-of social man
himself. Such a "biological" transformation
40 J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 28 (Regnery ed. 1955).
41 "The democratic process . . . is discredited
to such an extent that no part of it can be ex-
tracted which is not contaminated. Moreover,
using this process would divert energy to snail-
paced movements." LIBERATION 63.
42 LIBERATION ix; ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN xiv &
257; REASON AND REVOLUTION xi.
43 LIBERATION Viii. Query: The law having been
made in the past, and preserving past values and
modes of conduct in the present, does this posi-
tion mandate rejection of the legal order, not
for any "dishonest" purpose but for purposes of
breaking the historical continuity and thus sym-
bolically placing oneself over-and-against (gegen-
stand) the established order?
44 ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 4. But this can occur
only through "collective ownership, collective
control and planning of the means of production
and distribution." LIBERATION 87. I return to the
problem of central planning at note 96 infra.
17 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1971
can come about "only through a political
practice of methodical disengagement from
and refusal of the Establishment," and with
a touch of the prophet condemning Sodom
and Gomorrah, he adds that those who
join in the Refusal "[must] reject the rules
of the game that is rigged against them,
the ancient strategy of patience and per-
suasion, the reliance on the Good Will in
the Establishment, its false and immoral
comforts, its cruel affluence."4 5 Though
"radical political practice involves a cul-
tural subversion" 4 -by redefining words
like "obscene" to mean the hypocrisies of
the present society, by turning morality
against the Establishment-it "is affirma-
tive in that it envisages a new culture which
fulfills the humanistic promises betrayed
by the old culture. ' 47 Since the populace
has an almost organic adaptation to this
terrible but profitably functioning society,
they "cannot reject the system of domina-
tion without rejecting themselves. '4 Thus,
"we would have to conclude that liberation
would mean subversion against the will
and against the prevailing interests of the
great majority of the people."'4 9 Marcuse
envisions a new type of man: controlling
his own destiny, leisured, freed of injustice
through "human relationships no longer
mediated by the market, no longer based
on competitive exploitation or terror."50
45 LIBERATION.
46 Id. at 10.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 17.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 27, 46.
But the construction of such a society pre-
supposes a type of man with a different sen-
sitivity as well as consciousness: men who
would speak a different language, have dif-
ferent gestures, follow different impulses;
JURISPRUDENCE OF RADICAL CHANGE
Marcuse recognizes, as do many of his fol-
lowers, the educational value of physical
action as a means of creating a new at-
titude; the beginning of radical change in
consciousness, he says, is a period of en-
lightenment prior to material change, "a
period of education . . . which turns into
praxis: demonstration, confrontation, re-
bellion."51
Marcuse has raised a problem in the
legal system which is rarely touched in law
schools: the relation between underlying
values and express standards, between
one's private understanding of his role in
society and that society's public under-
standing of itself. However stated, the
polarities suggest a tension that law alone
cannot quite resolve. Although law needs
public acceptance and a measure of indi-
vidual commitment to insure compliance,
it cannot effectively command a general
commitment. It can, in a word, command
certain acts-but not a willingness to per-
form those acts. Commitment to certain
processes of resolving disputes, allocating
resources, making decisions, insuring that
change brings progress, and withal, main-
taining a living dialogue between governing
and governed-popular commitment to, or
at least acquiescence in, the legal institu-
tions of society is essential for their ef-
fective functioning.
52
men who have developed an instinctual bar-
rier against cruelty, brutality, ugliness.
id. at 21. Again, "the radical transformation of
society implies the union of the new sensibility
with a new rationality." Id. at 37. "[Rladical
change in consciousness is the beginning, the first
step in changing social existence: emergence of
the new Subject." Id. at 53.
51 Id. at 53. Cf. Repressive Tolerance at 101.
52 See C. HYNEMAN & C. GILBERT, POPULAR
This society has taken its institutions
for granted.5 3 They have worked tolerably
well, quite well compared to other systems
attempted in other societies. Until the last
decade, the winds of revolutionary change
that might shake domestic institutions not
firmly anchored in popular acceptance did
not blow across our country, so that what-
ever gaps separated underlying mores,
morals, worldview or ideology on the one
hand, and social arrangements, public laws,
and official practice on the other were
hardly noticed. Since everyone shared-or
seemed to share-the same underlying val-
ues, a public consensus on means5 4 gen-
erally (as well as on a wide range of ends),
everyone took those values for granted.
The deep differences were largely over
method or degree within the system; as
Marcuse would say, a matter of quantity
and not quality. Marcuse popularized-*
among a certain constituency-the truth
that the relationship between legal system
and underlying values is one of interde-
pendence. Since they support one another,
a person can attack one by attacking the
other. Accordingly, the "historical break
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 287 (1968): "Rules
that limit the behavior of an aggressive society
cannot be made effective by display of govern-
mental authority alone; there must be voluntary
adherence to the rules [as well]."
53 See C. FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 149 (1963):
The more generally the existing foundation of
the social order is accepted, as was the case in
the United States until recently and in Europe
during the nineteenth century, the more law
can be treated as if it were only a compro-
mise of existing interests-the reason being
that the deeper foundations, the "fundamental
agreements," are not questioned.
54 See J. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS
chs. 1-5 (1961).
with the past and present" becomes both a
self-induced alienation from popular mores
and habits and a similar isolation from the
influence of accepted legal processes. It is
thus a rooting out of the implicit commit-
ment to social rules that carries on in hu-
man psychology even after explicit com-
mitment has been permitted to atrophy.
When one "refuses" involvement with "the
System," he engages in a kind of reverse-
rehabilitation process, the goal now being
to leave the "square" world psychologically
-a world, incidentally, which takes the
norm to be the "law-abiding" and which
structures such myriad social relations
through law, both criminal and civil, that
a shortcut to self-alienation from that world
is to clash with its laws. Attack the legal
system-whether through ridicule, pur-
poseless violation, or pressure on author-
ities to abdicate-and one strikes at the
values and attitudes it reinforces. Or one
may reverse the direction of his sortie and
use Marcuse's "cultural subversion"-sym-
bolic acts, a life-style that ridicules in-
herited social arrangements, the "new
morality" or linguistic perversion-as a
rear guard assault on the legal system, of
which the traditional norms and values are
spirit and life. Marcuse notes the relation:
Even the most totalitarian technochratic-
political administration depends, for its
functioning, on what is usually called the
"moral fiber": . . . .A society depends on
the relatively stable and calculable sanity
of the people .... Moreover, a society also
demands to a considerable extent, belief in
one's beliefs (which is part of the required
sanity); belief in the operative value of
society's values. 55
55 LIBERATION 83-84. When these values break
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The original Marxist theory expected the
working class to be driven to a growing
consciousness of their alienation and the
oppressive purpose of bourgeois law and
values; this awareness would presage revo-
lution. Capitalism's resilience, however,
blunted the proletariat's revolutionary fer-
vor; thus, Marcuse suggests that history
has handed the torch of negative thinking
to ghetto dwellers and the student popula-
tion, who have "the common ground [of]
the total rejection of the existing society,
of its entire value system."5 6 In a style
reportorial but with a tone hortatory, Mar-
cuse in effect calls upon both groups to
reject the political process because liberal-
parliamentary democracy is a sham; the
politicians are irrelevant; the courts do
nothing to mitigate popular distrust; the
system not only takes too long but it is also
so discredited that its every part is con-
taminated.57 As the rejection is of the
down, and only then, he says, will the "political
climate . . .prevail" for new forms of struggle.
56 Id. at 58. As staging ground for the student
movement, the university receives general de-
mands for educational reform which are, Mar-
cuse says, "only the immediate expression of wide
and more fundamental aims." Id. at 59.
57 Id. at 63. The condemnation is elaborate and
forceful. It is instructive to juxtapose the ideas
about the legal system, the courts in particular,
and the need for "radical reform" offered by legal
scholar and practicing attorney John Frank who,
unlike Professor Marcuse, has had vast experi-
ence with the topic of his critique. See J. FRANK,
AMERICAN LAW: THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFORM
(1969), which moves far beyond the thundering
generalities in the passage just cited, to point out
precisely what is wrong and to offer specific
recommendations. Cf. John P. Frank-Radical
Judicial Reform Symposium, 47 TExAs L. REV.
965 (1969). The gap between the mountaintop
of theory and the marketplace of practice is made
greater by Marcuse's unfortunate habit of anath-
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social system as a whole, it is impossible
not to breach legality, for all enforceable
laws only serve the status quo, and "those
who refuse such service are eo ipso outside
the realm of law even before they come
into actual conflict with the law." 8 By
using Law and Order as a counter-revolu-
tionary force, the system of corporate capi-
talism presses the radical opposition into
direct action and uncivil disobedience. In-
doctrinated and self-perpetuating, the ma-
jority are open to changes within, but not
beyond, the institutionalized social system;
the radical must either surrender to the
power of the status quo or violate the law
and order of the status quo. 9
Marcuse is aware of the objection that
to set oneself up as judge of a legally
constituted society in place of the official
representatives and the majority of the
people is to opt for a self-appointed elite.
He notes further that between democracy
and dictatorship-even "benevolent" dic-
tatorship-democracy is certainly prefer-
able. He insists, however, that such a
democracy does not exist; rather, we have
a network of pressure groups, "machines,"
vested interests which control democratic
institutions. 60 To exchange these ruling
ematizing the unknown. Compare the field of
business, note 94 infra.
58 LIBERATION 67.
59 Id. at 69-70.
60 Robert Paul Wolff, colleague of Marcuse,
argues the failure of pluralism in Beyond Toler-
ance, another essay in A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOL-
ERANCE, supra note 13, at 36. For a more pro-
found appraisal of the need for pluralism, see
R. NISBET, COMMUNITY AND POWER 265-69,
283-84 (1962). Of this book, Adolf Berle com-
ments that pages 140 to 180 "ought to be required
reading for those currently attracted by the think-
minorities for an elite "would only mean
replacement of the present ruling elite by
another ... [which] may not be less quali-
fied and less threatening than the prevail-
ing one."'61 The positive, codified right of
existing society clashes with the negative,
unwritten human right of transcendence
-a standoff, he implies. And the standoff
is not broken by criticizing the radical for
violence when "violence is built into the
very structure of this society. '6 2 Especially
when one ponders the horror of our foreign
policy, he contends, "the traditional dis-
tinction between legitimate and illegitimate
violence becomes questionable. '63 "Law
and Order" are indeed necessary, but in
the present situation "law and order be-
come something to be established as
against the established law and order: the
existing society has become illegitimate,
unlawful: it has invalidated its own law."'64
"Repressive Tolerance" and the
Great Refusal
In A Critique of Pure Tolerance, Pro-
fessor Marcuse contributed an essay en-
titled "Repressive Tolerance," which is
ing of Herbert Marcuse. A. BERLE, POWER
573 (1969).
61 LIBERATION 70.
62 Id. at 75. "[A]s the accumulated aggressiveness
which drives the business of life in all branches
of corporate capitalism, as the legal aggression
on the highways, and as the national aggression
abroad .. " Id. at 75-76 (emphasis added). The
use of analogy to presume a point to be proved
is discussed in the text accompanying notes
101-07 infra.
63 Id. at 76.
64 Id. at 78. Thus, by a different route Marcuse
has arrived at the same conclusion as Marx. See
note 28 supra.
generally viewed as the epitome of his
thinking about the Great Refusal, as well
as a frontal attack on the tradition of
Burke and Mill regarding the method of
change in a free society.
Marcuse advances the paradoxical ob-
servation that "what is proclaimed and
practiced as tolerance today, is in many of
its most effective manifestations serving
the cause of repression." 65 Because of the
basically oppressive character of the status
quo, tolerance is extended to conditions
and modes of behavior which should not
be tolerated because they impede libera-
tion. Worse still, "within a repressive so-
ciety, even progressive movements [i.e.,
movements of radical negation] threaten
to turn into their opposite to the degree
to which they accept the rules of the
game."' 66 Tolerance is of two kinds: pas-
sive toleration of entrenched and estab-
lished attitudes and ideas (even if their
damaging effect is evident), and active or
official tolerance of the Right as well as of
the Left. The second form, "pure toler-
ance," is non-partisan, but its neutrality
"actually protects the already established
machinery of discrimination." 67 The goal
65 Repressive Tolerance at 83.
66 Id. at 83-84.
To take a most controversial case: the exercise
of political rights (such at voting, letter-writing
to the press, to Senators, etc., protest-demon-
strations with a priori renunciation of counter-
violence) in a society of total administration
serves to strengthen this administration by testi-
fying to the existence of democratic liberties
which, in reality, have changed their content
and lost their effectiveness. In such a case,
freedom (of opinion, of assembly, of speech)
becomes an instrument for absolving servitude.
Id.
67 Id. at 85.
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of struggle is to create a society wherein
''man is no longer enslaved by institutions
which vitiate self-determination from the
beginning," for "freedom" does not yet
exist; it "is still to be created." 68 The
standard, the effectuation of liberation,
therefore, "cannot be indiscriminate and
equal with respect to the contents of ex-
pression. . . . [I]t cannot protect false words
and wrong deeds which demonstrate that
they contradict and counteract the possi-
bilities of liberation." The rationale of free
speech and assembly was that men were
individuals who could come to reasonable
positions on their own, but since this sup-
position for universal toleration no longer
obtains-men are now manipulated and
indoctrinated-the indiscriminate guaranty
of political rights actually turns out to be
repressive. Thus tolerance itself is ques-
tionable. 69 Dominating through technology,
this society can condescend to permit the
68 Id. at 87.
69 Id. at 88, 90-91. Marcuse states: "The antag-
onistic structure of society rigs the rules of the
game. Those who stand against the established
system are a priori at a disadvantage, which is
not removed by the toleration of their ideas,
speeches, and newspapers." Id. at 92 (emphasis
added).
Unless this is an objection against having rules
at all, it should be apparent that this burden falls
equally on every party or person who would
change the status quo-including even those who
would change the status quo in San Diego by
imposing mandatory retirement on professors
who are beyond retirement age but continue to
teach. That Marcuse benefits by society's rules of
the game against self-help "repressive tolerance"
exercised by a populace resentful of his revolu-
tionary message is suggested indirectly in Legion
vs. Marcuse, 207 THE NATION 421 (1968); Gold,
Mao, Marx et Marcuse! Saturday Evening Post,
Oct. 19, 1968, at 56. The irony of escaping re-
pression through the protection of the "repressive
society's" legal forms is lost on him.
JURISPRUDENCE OF RADICAL CHANGE
appearance of freedom to opposition move-
ments, because the overwhelming majority,
secure in the increasing satisfaction of
needs, militates against qualitative social
change and sees to it that the radicals do
not really change anything. 0 Consequently,
it allows all points of view: Left and Right,
white and Negro, crusaders for armament
and for disarmament. Throughout the bab-
ble of competing voices "the people" are
supposed to decide; yet the unspoken con-
dition precedent to the success of demo-
cratic argument is that they have access to
authentic information and are capable of
autonomous thought. In our present era,
however, "the democratic argument for ab-
stract tolerance tends to be invalidated by
the invalidation of the democratic process
itself."71 The apparent objectivity of the
media fosters, in a totalitarian democracy,
a mental attitude which obliterates distinc-
tions between true and false, between in-
formation and indoctrination. In order to
break out of the established universe of
meaning, this deceptive impartiality must
be abandoned, the prevailing indoctrina-
tion offset, and the trend reversed: the
people "would have to get information
slanted in the opposite direction. '7 2 To
70 Repressive Tolerance at 94.
71 Id. at 95.
72 Id. at 99. He asserts that such a recommenda-
tion does not amount to espousal of a dictator-
ship; for despite its limitations and distortions,
democratic tolerance is always more humane than
the institutionalized intolerance of a dictatorship.
But he states there is a third alternative other
than dictatorship and our present democracy: to
change this society to make it truly democratic.
He does not discuss prior twentieth-century ex-
periments in "slanting" information in the direc-
tion a ruling elite thinks best for the people, nor
does he explain how his proposal would differ
open up the ways by which a subversive
majority could develop "may require ap-
parently undemocratic means," which
"would include the withdrawal of tolera-
tion of speech and assembly from groups
and movements which promote aggressive
policies, armament, chauvinism, discrimi-
nation on the grounds of race and re-
ligion, or which oppose the extension of
public services, social security, medical
care, etc.," and "may necessitate new and
rigid restrictions on teachings and prac-
tices in the educational institutions. .. .
This position, he continues, entails re-
examining the traditional distinction be-
tween violent and nonviolent action, for
in terms of its historical function there is
a difference between revolutionary and
reactionary violence. The natural question
-Who makes the judgment between the
two kinds of violence and by what stan-
dards?-can have only one logical answer:
everyone who has learned to think ra-
tionally and autonomously-a number, in
an indoctrinated society, that would be
quite small and not necessarily the peo-
ple's elected representatives. The historical
record reveals that violence from below,
by the oppressed masses, leads to progress
in civilization, and that one can anticipate
whether a violent "movement would serve
the revamping of the old order or the
emergence of the new."714
Liberating tolerance, then, would mean
intolerance against movements from the
Right, and toleration of movements from
from the work of the Ministry of Truth in Or-
well's 1984.
7 Id. at 100.
74 Id. at 108-09.
the Left. As to [its] scope: it would extend
to the stage of action as well as of discus-
sion and propaganda, of deed as well as of
word. The traditional criterion of clear and
present danger seems no longer adequate
where the whole society is . . . in a period
[of] clear and present danger. 75
Our whole society being in extreme danger,
an extreme suspension of the rights of free
speech and assembly is justified: tolerance
should be withdrawn before the deed, at
the stage of communication in word or art
form. The deterioration of democracy has
proceeded so far that false consciousness
has become the general consciousness; the
only remedy is "withdrawal of tolerance
from regressive movements before they can
become active; intolerance even toward
thought, opinion, and word," for "I main-
tain that there are issues where either
there is no 'other side' in any more than a
formalistic sense, or where 'the other side'
is demonstrably 'regressive' and impedes
possible improvement of the human condi-
tion." 76
An Evaluation: The Power
of Negative Thinking
John Stuart Mill observed sagely that
"it is the fashion . . . to disparage negative
75 Id. at 109. The reference is to Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), wherein
Mr. Justice Holmes enunciated the classic test of
free speech hindrance:
The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substan-
tive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
It is a question of proximity and degree."
76 Repressive Tolerance at 110, 120. The latter
appears in a Postscript to the essay, written in
1968.
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logic-that which points out weaknesses
in theory or errors in practice, without
establishing positive truths. ' 77 Marcuse's
thought is "negative," in the metaphysical
sense: 78 in both epistemological theory and
political practice one moves to truth by
grasping, in the first instance, the falsity
of the given. The Hegelian dialectic, with
its many levels of application and subtlety,
is not the customary method of thought in
the English-speaking West, but it has
guided Marcuse to some conclusions that
deserve a hearing; his many-sided analysis
may well prompt agreement on individual
points without acceptance of the entirety.
Such an acceptance may well be impossible
for a person operating out of the tradition
of Burke and Mill, simply because of the
gulf separating the "spiritual universe" of
British empiricism from that of Conti-
nental ideology. Or it may be, as this
paper will argue, because of Marcuse's
insufficient familiarity with important so-
cietal institutions, such as law and business,
and the disturbing implications of his
recommendations about means to achieve
his ends.7 9
77 J. MILL, supra note 40, at 64.
78 See note 21 supra.
79 To those who take issue with Marcuse there is
a convenient rejoinder. See One-Dimensional
Philosopher at 40, wherein the author states that
"[t]o most criticisms, Marcuse smilingly answers
that his intellectual opponents are simply one-
dimensional prisoners of the system." Marcuse's
method of answering in advance the objection
that his ideas are utopian appears as follows:
"The unrealistic sound of these propositions is
indicative, not of their utopian character, but of
the strength of the forces which prevent their
realization." ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 4.
The weakness of this kind of rebuttal is that it
smacks of the ad hominem attack and presumes
what must be proved-that the "system" "im-
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No quarrel need ensue, however, if one
begins by adverting to some affirmative
aspects of Marcuse's negative thinking. As
a theoretician whose thought process is
geared to transcendence, he has little pa-
tience with philosophical positivism, which,
he believes, artificially narrows one's per-
spective to the "is" while excluding the
"ought"-the alternative-which is beyond
the grasp of empirical method or expres-
sion in "operational terms" but is nonethe-
less real. Emphatic that if any style of
thought is "one-dimensional," this is, Mar-
cuse argues that one of positivism's con-
temporary offspring, analytic philosophy,
trivializes philosophy and cosmic problems
by a nit-picking method that refuses to
attend to anything but simple, everyday
sentences and situations. His particular
insight is to focus on the connection be-
tween philosophical positivism and societal
resistance-to-change. He believes posi-
tivism's flattening out of the world of
meaning and alternatives in thought is the
philosophical counterpart of a similar
emasculation rampant in people's psychol-
ogy, politics, and social relations. They
accept the given as the right. They sur-
render to a self-validating system. Thus
they lose the power-even in thought-to
stand outside it and challenge it in terms
of alternatives. They demean themselves by
acquiescing to the positivist truncation of
the philosopher's witness, which is to
prisons" men intellectually, and sets the stage for
a similar counterattack: that Marcuse himself is a
"prisoner"-of ideology. Whatever the merits of
this debate technique, it is still true that even if
Marcuse were right about all the evils of "the
system," that fact alone does not prove that his
alternative would be any better.
stand over-and-against the irrational while
subjecting it to the scrutiny of reason."'
One can sense Marcuse's horror at the
positivist renunciation of theory as he re-
coils from "Bishop Butler's pronounce-
ment which adorns G.E. Moore's Principia
Ethica: 'Everything is what it is, and not
another thing?' "81-even as Hegel would
be horrified-or as he notes that neoposi-
tivism sets up a comfortable "reservation"
for certain modes of thought, thereby in-
sulating "the normal universe of discourse
from being seriously disturbed by unfitting
ideas": 82
The neo-positivist critique still directs its
main effort against metaphysical notions,
and it is motivated by a notion of exactness
which is either that of formal logic or em-
pirical description. Whether exactness is
sought in the analytic purity of logic and
mathematics, or in conformity with ordi-
nary language-on both poles of contem-
porary philosophy is the same rejection or
devaluation of those elements of thought
and speech which transcend the accepted
system of validation ... s
and are set aside-segregated?-as "po-
etic" or "metaphysical."
Admittedly, Marcuse is far from the
first to question the adequacy of posi-
80 The positivist "analysis abstracts from the
negative, from that which is alien and antagonistic
and cannot be understood in terms of the estab-
lished usage .... In barring access to this realm
[of knowledge beyond common sense and formal
logic], positivist philosophy sets up a self-suffi-
cient world of its own, closed and well protected
against the ingressing of disturbing external fac-
tors." ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 182.
81 Id. at 184.
82 Id.
83 Id.
tivism.8 4 Nor is he original in his concern
about the dehumanization of man in the
technological society. 5 But he has shown
originality in combining an attack on the
general philosophical underpinnings of a
society with a prophet's wrath at its prac-
tical excesses.,0 Moreover, as any prophet,
his mission is essentially normative rather
than descriptive. He arrived on the scene
at a time when many students and young
intellectuals have become disenchanted
with logical positivism pushed to-shall
we say?-its logical conclusion, either in
sterile analysis of words and simple sen-
tences in the classroom or in the piecemeal
reform of societal institutions that leaves
them in essence as they were. He offered a
normative critique quite heady compared
to the intellectual pablum they feel has
heretofore been their diet. Students for a
Democratic Society and other radical pro-
test groups are essentially normative: they
stand outside the accepted scheme of things
in order to criticize it, to distinguish clearly
the is from the ought, and to assert that
the latter is both knowable and attain-
able.87 By pounding his many theses of
84 From quite a different perspective, Professor
Lon L. Fuller attacked positivism in jurispru-
dence. See L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF
ITSELF (1940). The argument that ensued is
traced, with citations from contemporary posi-
tivist jurists, in Fuller, A Reply to Critics, in THE
MORALITY OF LAW 187-242 (rev. ed. 1969).
85 See note 25 supra. This theme is so common-
place today that citation is hardly necessary.
Nevertheless, at least passing reference is owed to
a Continental philosopher whose "feel" for the
human condition is extraordinarily sensitive. See
G. MARCEL, MAN AGAINST MASS SOCIETY (1962).
86 See Stillman, supra note 25.
87 For interesting comments about Marcuse and
Continental student protest groups, see Cranston,
Neocommunism and the Students' Revolts, 1
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dissent on the university door, Marcuse
resembles Luther striking at the "estab-
lished" system, which in his day bound
theological thought and religious practice;
or an intellectual Moses leading his people
across a spiritual desert where they must
create "new forms" of social life as the
price for redemption of the class they
represent-the "disinherited of the earth"
-in the promised land, which for Marcuse
will be the unrepressive, technologically
abundant, classless society. To avoid stag-
nation, every society needs its prophets.
Lawyers especially owe a certain debt
to a prophet like Marcuse. Busy tending
the machinery of society, we often fail to
ask where the machine is going; com-
placent in that successful daily conflict-
resolution which Marcuse so roundly con-
demns, we rarely consider the ethical
implications of the system as a whole.
Skilled at utilizing the democratic process,
we scarcely consider the need for commit-
ment, values, and underlying consensus.
We write elaborate scholarly briefs on nar-
row points within the legal system; but
few of us have bothered to compose a
brief that would prove the value of the
system itself to the dissenter. If "political
due process" is the soul of Western legal
thought, Marcuse's student followers, un-
der his tutelage, have drawn up an indict-
ment with its chief count the accusation
that the system is a Frankenstein. In effect,
they say, "Prove that it needs a soul-and
has one."
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM, July-
October 1968, at 40. This is an interdisciplinary
journal published quarterly by the School of
Politics and International Relations, University of
Southern California.
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An Evaluation: The' Limits of
Negative Thought
Before an examination of the indictment
itself, a discussion of how it is reached is
in order. A careful reading of Marcuse's
analysis raises grave doubts about its ade-
quacy. These doubts cluster around four
main themes: first, his lack of experience
with the processes he so confidently con-
demns; second, the rhetorical device of
redefining words to "prove" an otherwise
controverted point; third, his utopianism;
and fourth, the facile transfer of Hegelian
dialectic from the conceptual domain of
thought to the real world of society.
The pervasive question is whether Mar-
cuse carries the burden of proof. We must
ask whether he has proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt the guilt of the political-legal
system so that the verdict of the death
penalty should indeed be rendered. In or-
der to comprehend how crucial this evi-
dentiary question is, we must clearly under-
stand, at the outset, what the issue is and
where the burden of proof lies. As to the
former question, at stake is not a given
objectional practice in American society
-say de facto segregation, conformity
pressures on middle management,88 pollu-
tion, or any other specific evil; if such
specifics were at stake one could neutralize
their probative impact by recitation of
other particulars which are positive, bene-
ficial and good-the widespread private
philanthropy in this country, open-ended
upward mobility, religious and economic
freedom, even the "bourgeois" comforts of
88 Popularized in W. WHYTE, THE ORGANIZATION
MAN (1956), acknowledged by Marcuse in ONE-
DIMENSIONAL MAN XVii.
central heating. Such a litany of social vir-
tue is as irrelevant as any litany of social
vice. The goal of the new sensitivity and
new consciousness, Marcuse explains, "im-
plies rejection of those policies of recon-
struction, no matter how revolutionary,
which are bound to perpetuate ... the pat-
tern of the unfree societies and their
needs."8 9 He means that any reform which
would ameliorate or remove many of the
contemporary social evils is not the goal,
for such reform would only impede true
progress toward a different system by mak-
ing this one more tolerable. The prisoner
at the bar, he contends, has no redeeming
features and simply cannot be rehabilitated.
Further, the transformation must be total.
Not socializing the means of production,
not changing national priorities, not recon-
ciling the races-not any single radical im-
provement is enough. Although useful,
these are merely piecemeal. They leave
the essentials intact. For Marcuse, there
must be a substantial change in the en-
tire social-economic-political-legal-aesthet-
ic-biological-philosophical life of this so-
ciety.90
Precisely because of the pristine, un-
compromising absoluteness of the Mar-
cusian prescription, the burden of proof
question becomes crucial. Since his diag-
nosis is so pessimistic, it is natural to
inquire how deeply the physician has
examined, what tests he has conducted,
what verification rules out contrary hy-
potheses, what is the recommended sur-
gery's price, and what are its chances for
89 LIBERATION 86.
90 Id. chs. 1-2; see also Political Preface to H.
MARCUSE, EROS AND CIVILIZATION (1966).
success. Indeed, so total will be the op-
eration's shock to the system, it is fair to
ask whether the physician or his colleagues
of the same school can point to any prior
successes.
Lack of Experience
However the inquiry be framed, an es-
sential element must be the depth of
Marcuse's experience of living in this so-
ciety. And here the evidence seems par-
ticularly weak. Although he occasionally
introduces some concrete examples, these
are afterthoughts illustrating points already
presumed "proved." 91 The evidence con-
sists largely of a lavish sprinkling of quota-
tions from French and German writers
dealing theoretically with the problems of
modern man, but only a few who philoso-
phize about concrete experience here. On
a general level Marcuse is familiar with
numerous abstractions-"economic rela-
tions," "social system," "alienation,"-but
on the practical level of specifics he reveals
that his witness is based on hearsay and
second-hand information, for he cannot
discuss subsidiary institutions with any de-
91 ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 226-27. The lesson to
be drawn from these examples-riding in a new
car, walking in a national park, riding in a sub-
way-is ambiguous. These experiences are open
to other interpretations and are not the same in
each person. Marcuse's attempt to use trivia to
"prove" important points is dissected brilliantly
by Vivas, supra note 2, at 65. For a more favor-
able approach, see Peretz, supra note 6.
Howe, supra note 2, at 86, observes of Mar-
cuse's fact-consciousness: "Marcuse's work is
striking for its utter absence of factual material;
he seems proud of his freedom from the restraints
of the empirical .... As a result of this abstract-
edness, Marcuse soon evokes a solipsistic universe
in which he communes exclusively with his own
self-confirming categories."
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gree of familiarity. Thus, if the topic is
economics, he has predictable aversion to
the "private interests" and "corporate
capitalism" '92 which prey upon the public;
and he asserts confidentially that central
planning would unlock the potentials of
the technological society that the capital-
ists have inhibited, resulting in rapid ab-
olition of poverty. 93 Such denunciations
would carry more weight if their author
could draw upon his own experience with
a company's inner workings, had empa-
thized with the problems of labor and man-
agement, had felt the tensions within the
industrial enterprise, and had dealt with
the resistance to authoritarian direction-
from-the-top that human beings display in
the face of all theories that society can be
run like an army. But Marcuse's life and
vocation lay elsewhere, in the academy,
not the corporation; grappling with Hegel-
ian dialectic, not profit-margin or labor-
management relations.
Despite this absence of personal experi-
ence with production problems, Marcuse
should be esteemed no less as a thinker;
but it is fair, if one adopts that critical,
negative sense of looking for the "alterna-
tive" to the "given," to ask that the expert
witness have some expertise upon which
to base those confident prophecies he so
cavalierly gives the reader. That Marcuse
is a hostile witness to the present system of
production and distribution goes without
saying; but that he should be accepted
without challenge as an expert witness be-
comes especially questionable when we
turn to the other side of the allegation, the
112 LIBERATION 76.
93 ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 251.
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assertion that a centrally planned society
could do the job much better. Again, he
has no experience to back up this asser-
tion. • 4 Discounting the question-never
answered-how such a "planned" society
would differ from the "administered" so-
ciety he criticizes-recent experience dem-
onstrates that the most extreme efforts to
"plan" a nation's economy have failed. 9'5
94 See P. DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY: THE
ANATOMY OF THE INDUSTRIAL ORDER 279-80
(1962):
[A] planned economy depends more on the
proper discharge of the top-management func-
tion and makes infinitely greater demands on
its top management than any other form of
economic organization we know. We might say
that a planned economy rests on the proposi-
tion that management can be selected so as to
be perfect and infallible. Such supreme confi-
dence in human perfectibility may be forgiven
people who, like most advocates of a "planned
economy," have never seen a management in
action and have little idea how imperfectly and
how fallibly it operates.
(Emphasis added.)
95 See Hearings on the Military Budget and Na-
tional Economic Priorities Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Economy in Government of the
Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 3, 958-61 (1969):
[T]he Soviet economy, with its bureaucratic
methods and irrational price structure, is waste-
ful of its resources. Capital is ill-applied and
badly utilized.
Id. at 958.
[Tihe use of economic resources through in-
vestment has become progressively less effi-
cient; or in other words, there has been a
decline in the growth of output obtained from
each ruble of investment . . . the central
planners still exercise virtually all of the com-
mand functions . . . and it is precisely this
inflexible and topheavy rule that reinforces the
inherent wastes....
Id. at 961. See also E. LYONS, WORKERS' PARA-
OISE LOST ch. 11 (1967); and the long series by
Shub, Russia Turns Back the Clock, The Wash-
ington Post, June 18 & 19, 1969, at A-1, col. 1.
These failures are on record. 96 The infer-
ences drawn from that record may be re-
buttable and some political theorists might
devise a scheme wherein the command
economy would somehow avoid bogging
down in bureaucracy, waste, and political
intrigue. However, Marcuse does not at-
tempt the task. This omission can only
raise grave doubts about his understand-
ing of the workings of the political econ-
omy.
A similar misapprehension is visible in
his offhand remarks about law. As a Marx-
ist, Marcuse's presupposition is akin to
Marx's, that law is at root a sham, a dis-
guised method of covering an apparatus
of repression with a veneer of legitimacy. 97
These observations are confirmed by professional
economists. See note 97 infra.
96 See E. ZALESKI, PLANNING REFORMS IN THE
SOVIET UNION 1962-1966 48-93 (M. McAndrew &
G. Nutter transl. 1967); THE SOVIET ECONOMY
(M. Bornstein & D. Fusfeld eds. 1967) especially
chapters 22-24 dealing with the Liberman re-
forms. Marcuse's ignorance of the real problems
in central planning cannot be excused on the
ground that these books postdate One-Dimen-
sional Man, for much of the data which Zaleski
and others rely on was extant before 1964. In any
event, Marcuse's recent works make no reference
to any of the studies now available to him, nor
do they retract an iota from his commitment to
central planning as a cure-all for world poverty.
Yet the economic history of the Soviet Union,
from the time of the Liberman proposals in 1962,
common knowledge as it is, should at least be
mentioned by one who teaches his students that
the road to "liberation" of the economy lies in
collectivization and central planning. The com-
ment alleging the reason for opposition to central
planning, at note 93 supra, is a gratuitous slur on
anyone who might sincerely disagree with him
and is unsupported by any proof in his text.
97 For brief but incisive commentaries on some
legal implications in the Marxist analysis, see E.
BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 79-81 (1967);
FRIEDRICH, supra note 53, at 143-53.
Whether one focuses on the exploits of
Perry Mason or the encounters of real-life
police and ghetto residents, such a view is
understandable. But prosecutor and po-
liceman operate only within a narrow
range of the law. If one believes that the
legal system is "repressive" because some
laws or law-enforcers limit autonomous
freedom, he should, by the same token,
admit that the system is "liberative" be-
cause other laws and law-related forms
protect autonomous freedom and foster
opportunity to live the humane life. Thus,
tort law protects the dignity of personal-
ity; contract law provides a kind of "lan-
guage of trade" whereby persons can vol-
untarily commit themselves to certain
costly engagements with the confidence of
secured return-and, in the process, create
an overflow of value for others to share;98
corporation law creates new forms of prop-
erty management which engenders a mul-
tiplication of wealth shared by millions as
users of inexpensive products, recipients
of dividends, and earners of wages. 99 Civil
98 R. POUND, THE TASK OF THE LAW (1944).
[There is a] demand of the economic order for
certainty, uniformity, and stability in the ad-
ministration of justice, without which any high
degree of economic development is impossible.
[.. [In societies without a web of reasonable
laws,] one cannot with safety do anything in-
volving large expenditure of labor or money or
extending over a long period of time. With in-
creasing complexity of affairs the bad eco-
nomic effects of lack of rule and uniformity in
the administration of justice are more acute.
The progress of civilization increases this com-
plexity and demands law, that is, system and
order and rule in the administration of justice
so that men may act assuredly with reference
to the future.
Id. at 17-18.
99 W. LIPPMANN, THE GOOD SOCIETY (1943):
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courts resolve conflict peacefully; admin-
istrative agencies attempt to harmonize
collective interests with an eye, at least,
toward the public interest; legislatures on
every level from the local town council to
the United States Congress struggle with
the task of managing a turbulent and
rapidly-changing society through the peace-
ful mechanism of law. The power of the
State itself is limited by the Constitution
with such crucial notions as "due process
of law" and "freedom of speech," a limi-
tation which is no small achievement in an
era which witnessed the Gestapo, the
K.G.B., and the Red Guards. The goal is
to liberate the individual for life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness. The web of
institutions which we all take for granted
is so largely dependent upon law for struc-
ture, harmonization, and protection, that
none of us could fulfill his own needs for
a week-whether food, clothing, shelter or
education, association, religion or self-
government-without continual reliance
upon the life-support system, i.e., the en-
vironment of law. The legal system at-
tempts to be even-handed, and thus ex-
tends its assistance to its critics, such as
Professor Marcuse: it will enforce his con-
tract to teach, protect his person, and see
to it that the royalties on his books are
paid. It secures his freedom to travel and
to speak. It protects him against powerful
persons who may resent his success or
object to his point of view-a protection
the legal system of his homeland was too
"The whole of it, all property, and everything
which we include in the general name of private
enterprise, is the product of a legal development
and can exist only by virtue of the law." Id. at 273.
This book is not an argument for laissez faire.
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weak to accord him in the 1930's. Mar-
cuse's distaste for the laws which impede
radical transformation of the system is un-
derstandable; nonetheless, the suggestion
even as an inference, that the legal system
is, as a whole, repressive of human per-
sonality bespeaks an unfamiliarity with the
realities of law and its role in our lives.' 0
0
Rhetorical Legerdemain
A rhetorical device which enables quick
transit from assertion of the evils of the
present social order to assertion of the
essential evil of that order itself, and cor-
relatively, to the insistence that the order
must be completely changed in a "qual-
itative" way is Marcuse's unique use of
analogy and word-redefinition. He is quite
willing to attribute to words which are
crucial for his analysis-such as "impov-
erishment," "enslavement," "domination,"
"violence," "aggression" 1 01
-an expansive
100 See note 57 supra.
101 For instance, in One-Dimensional Man, Mar-
cuse admits that he changes the meaning of
words, although he attempts to put the onus of
redefinition on others:
One must insist on the inner connection be-
tween the Marxian concepts of exploitation
and impoverishment in spite of later redefini-
tions, in which impoverishment either becomes
a cultural aspect, or relative to such an extent
that it applies also to the suburban home with
automobile, television, etc. "Impoverishment"
connotes the absolute need and necessity of
subverting intolerable conditions of existence,
and such absolute need appears in the begin-
nings of all revolution against the basic social
institutions.
ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 26.
Though this device is commonplace throughout
the books under consideration, space here permits
inspection of only a few key instances. Thus, "im-
poverishment" normally means "reduced to pov-
erty" and connotes physical deprivation, absence
meaning their original, common and every-
day use does not import. Thus, in a pas-
sage generally critical of automation he
speaks of a "kind of masterly enslavement
...not essentially different from that of
the typist, the bank teller, the high-pres-
sure salesman .. .and the television an-
nouncer."'102 In a description of Western
technological society, he says "[tihe instru-
ments of productivity and progress, orga-
nized into a totalitarian system, determine
not only the actual but also the possible
utilizations . . . domination functions as
administration . . . [when] the adminis-
tered life becomes the good life of the
whole [we have] the pure form of domina-
tion. '103 An Essay on Liberation states
that "violence is built into the very struc-
ture of this society: as the accumulated
aggressiveness which drives the business of
life in all branches of corporate capital-
of material necessities, etc. "Enslavement" sug-
gests physical domination under which a person is
treated like a chattel and even in its secondary
meaning, at stating a general relationship of one-
way compulsion-"He was a slave to that drug"
-strongly implies lack of volition, debasing treat-
ment, helplessness, harm to the "slave." Similarly,
"totalitarian" in modern times is a descriptive
term for dictatorial governments which through
unrestrained power attempt to control every sig-
nificant facet of their subjects' lives, against their
will, utilizing raw police-military force to insure
compliance. Again, "violence" is commonly asso-
ciated with rough or random physical force in
action; "aggression" with the purposeful and un-
just offensive attack on another individual or
nation. These definitions are based on the Ran-
dom House AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY
(Random House ed. 1962); however, that they
substantially comport with contemporary usage
can be demonstrated by appealing to the reader's
personal experience with the language.
102 ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 25.
103 Id. at 225.
ism, as the legal aggression on the high-
ways, and as the national aggression
abroad .... -104
Marcuse's method is, generally, to take
a word which primarily describes con-
crete, almost palpable, relationships,
instances of which one could watch hap-
pening before his own eyes-the impov-
erished beggar lying in a Skid Row gutter,
the lynch mob violently seizing its prey-
and transfer it, the relationships it sum-
marizes, and their connotations to abstract
relations which thereby assume much of
the same immediacy and reality possessed
by the concrete analogue. The pejorative
nuances associated with the concrete action
or relation also carry over to the abstract.
At root, the method appears to be argu-
ment from analogy, a technique as old as
literature itself, but one fraught with oc-
casions for fallacy. The writer can assume
the very point to be proved: that because
some characteristics in the well-known con-
crete example recur-or seem to recur-
in the abstract analogue, all characteristics
so recur, and the interrelationships also are
replicated, as, finally, are the moral judg-
ments evoked. Thus the slave-owner "dom-
inated" his slaves, and the technological
society "dominates" its subjects. The am-
bitious businessman is as "aggressive" as
the drivers on our highways, and so also
the Vietnam foreign policy. The moral
judgment anyone would pass upon slavery
or a war of aggression is, by the simple
transfer of the word, wrenched out of its
appropriate context and levelled at a pat-
tern or activity where, without the surrepti-
tious insertion by analogy, it would require
104 LIBERATION 75-76.
17 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1971
far more proof than the writer adduces.
"Such arguments introduce assumptions in
a metaphorical guise," one commentator
on logic has noted, "in which they are not
readily detected or easily criticized. In
place of analysis they attempt to identify
their position with some familiar symbol
which will evoke a predictable, emotional
response in the reader."'10 5  Marcuse's
method enables him to knock down con-
venient straw-men without stating the dis-
tinctions in the concepts he is merging.
And so "administration" becomes "dom-
ination," which turns into "enslavement,"
which at last emerges as "totalitarian."
And somewhere along this winding road,
some members of the party have disap-
peared and some have joined the troupe:
for instance, the fact of the consent of the
people to the basic institutions of society,
possibly implicit in the relatively non-
pejorative word "administration," has dis-
appeared, to be replaced by the innuendo
of popular helplessness in the face of the
"totalitarian" Leviathan. The enslavement
of a bygone era, with its cat-o'-nine-tai!s
and chains for enforcement, with its end-
less hours of unrewarded human toil, Mar-
cuse discerns covertly present in the media,
behind the apparatus of technology and
within the forms of social experience. Un-
105 See Davis, Logic and Logical Fallacies, in
CONTEXTS FOR COMPOSITION 96 (S. Clayes & D.
Spencer eds. 1965). The reader may wonder at
the many meanings of the word "aggression":
how is centralized "aggression," if such it be, in a
war akin to discrete and individualized driving
habits on a highway? And what does the latter
have to do with evaluating a society, since one
could probably find as many careful, or even
hyper-cautious drivers, as truly "aggressive" ones?
See also Nutting, Newspeak 1970, 56 A.B.A.J.
131 (1970).
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der Marcuse's alchemy, words undergo a
Doctor Jekyll-Mr. Hyde transformation.
Now it is quite true that he does not rely
merely on metaphorical devices to make
his case; and that our society does manifest
numerous structural evils along with a
shallow materialism that deserves his evan-
gelistic critique. But in his eagerness to
move from the particular to the universal,
the rhetorical condemnation goes beyond
the evidence and assumes a meaning to
words and an application of them to given
realities which is the whole issue to be
proved. Effective as the discourse may be
on the speaker's rostrum, one cannot prove
this society "totalitarian" simply by calling
it such, and then adding a few arguable ex-
amples of repression. The logical task of
proving a democracy to be "totalitarian" is
really quite complex.10 6
106 If one would show that the United States is
"totalitarian" he must show that it is "like" Nazi
Germany or Stalinist Russia, since these are the
two modern and familiar examples from which
the word draws its meaning. Such a demonstra-
tion entails convincing the reader (a) that the
relationships in this society are identical to, paral-
lel, or are (at least) "like"-another analogy-
those in Germany and Russia of that era, and (b)
that there are no significant differences which
could spoil the resemblance between them. See
W. FEARNSIDE & W. HOLTHER, FALLACY: THE
COUNTERFEIT OF ARGUMENT 22-27 (1961). Such
an enterprise entails a standard of comparison
and exclusion as well as articulation of how one
judges the weight to be given to comparative
factors.
In the example at hand, in Germany and Rus-
sia these factors, among others, must certainly be
sign~ficant: (a) elitist control through a single
"party"; (b) secret police comprising a "state
within a state" and unrestrained by constitutional
inhibitions or court supervision; (c) intense, one-
sided propaganda; (d) systematic violent eradica-
tion of real or potential adversaries of the regime;
Utopianism
Marcuse's vision of the "Alternative"
society is so totally beyond experience that
(e) absence of legal forms to distribute and trans-
mit power through predictable and generally ac-
cepted structures; (f) an implicit command-
theory of government that likens the leadership's
role to the general staff of an army; (g) a psy-
chology of suspicion that assumes that anyone
who fails to show outward enthusiasm for the
regime's every policy is therefore disloyal; (h)
deterioration of the laws to the level of arbitrary
edicts; (i) breakdown of subsidiary institutions
(trade unions, church groups, business associa-
tions) to the point that they are absorbed by and
become an arm of the State itself; (j) general
mismanagement of the economy which can be
cured only by a war psychology that can unite
the people against a common outside enemy; (k)
the emergence in the leadership of a single, all-
consuming goal: to stay in power at all costs (at
the price of other, more traditional governmental
goals, subsumed in the phrase, "to serve the peo-
ple"); (1) the public "purging" of scapegoats on
trumped-up charges to instill popular loyalty and
turn popular discontent at a visible target on
whom all wrongs can be blamed; (m) censorship
and book-burning as part of a general campaign
to discredit the heroes and practices of the mem-
orable past and substitute a future-orientation in
popular aspirations as a distraction from the ideas
and comforts of the remembered past and from
the sufferings of the present; (n) pervading all
the foregoing a ruthless thoroughness and wanton
denial of the classic forms of "due process of
law." See generally R. CONQUEST, THE GREAT
TERROR: STALIN'S PURGE OF THE THIRTIES
(1968); W. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
THIRD REICH 268-76, 937-94 (1960). Awareness
of many of the foregoing in Germany moved
Churchill to observe that "conditions in Germany
bore no resemblance to those of a civilized state."
1 W. CHURCHILL, THE SECOND WORLD WAR 91
(1948). A chief cause of such barbarism is the
total breakdown of the Rule of Law.
These are some of the major characteristics of
totalitarianism. Surely if the contemporary soci-
ety is "totalitarian" it would exhibit most of these
qualities, especially those associated with arbi-
trary power by a lawless elite group directly
controlling the State for its own purposes. Mar-
it can only be called utopian. This is not
the simplistic stricture that his alternative
itself is "no place," does not exist, and so
does not deserve our efforts; for neither
did any improvement of the human condi-
tion when first conceived. Rather, the ob-
jection is threefold. First, the goal is so
vague that one cannot know where Mar-
cuse is leading him; yet, in an age so
vitally concerned with "truth in packaging"
and consumer protection, the buyer should
have more to inspect than glittering gen-
eralities about the performance of the
product labeled "total transformation of
society.' l0 Second, the price is unclear.
The student purchasers of the new society
are told only that the price will be high and
cuse does make some generalized comparisons:
thus the media "control" our thoughts, the Law
impedes radical change, the consensus on techno-
logical institutions is akin to one-party rule; he
admits there are some significant differences (of
form, if not of content) too: "Our society distin-
guishes itself by conquering the centrifugal social
forces with Technology rather than Terror, on the
dual basis of an overwhelming efficiency and an
increasing standard of living." ONE-DIMENSIONAL
MAN x. The same terror-technology difference is
stated at 227. But the issue at stake, which he
does not take up, is the significant differences be-
tween each two instances; e.g., the way and the
extent to which the media "control"-again an
analogous word-how completely the Law stops
"radical change," whether it is at all accurate to
liken a diffuse acceptance of institutions to one-
party domination. Is there no real difference be-
tween a regime that "dominates" by technology
and one that rules by terror?
107 ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 234: "Industrial so-
ciety possesses the instrumentalities for trans-
forming the metaphysical into the physical, the
inner into the outer, the adventures of the mind
into adventures of technology." Id. And "the
Logos of technics would open a universe of quali-
tatively different relations between man and man,
and man and nature." Id. at 235.
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the installments continuous;108 moreover,
delivery is not guaranteed. If delivery is
made, no warranty promises that the prod-
uct will perform as advertised; in fact,
earlier models attempted in this century
did more harm to their users than good.
Since the designer is in no position to stand
behind the product, the consumers must be
content to let the losses fall on themselves
and the rest of society if the product does
prove a failure. Third, (dispensing with
the parallel to consumer protection) Mar-
cuse erects an abstract ideal and then
judges concrete realities against it; when
these present realities are found wanting,
he does not inquire whether the infinite
gap between ideal and reality is due to the
present's imperfection or the future's im-
possibility. Yet the method is essentially
unfair, for the actual can never compete
with the possible and always stands con-
demned by comparison. Although the
utopian ideal, if specified, can attract, it
should not be the sole standard of judg-
ment. Marcuse goes the prophets of old
one better: they judged an evil society
against norms their listeners themselves
knew they could emulate if they tried;
Marcuse judges against norms only the
angels would recognize.
The Unwarranted Leap from Epistemology
to Polity
Marcuse assumes that conceptual rela-
tions and the process of arriving at a
"higher" truth have their exact counter-
108 See Vivas, supra note 2, at 57: "Marcuse has
nothing to say about the price in blood and pain
that the eradication of our society would entail.
. . . The price? [It] will be high, we need not
doubt."
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parts in the political world. Thus, if
thought is a process of "negating" the
given, social progress is a process of negat-
ing the present social order. If thought
progresses through "contradiction," so
then must those who want social progress
stand against, oppose, "contradict" the
present order. If thought moves necessarily
to "higher" stages and somehow subsumes
in a comprehensive synthesis what truths
lay on the "lower" levels, so social change
-if "radical," i.e., contradictory enough
-will necessarily lead to a "higher" or
better society. The fallacy is to confuse
Hegelian metaphysics with political reali-
ties. Since the two orders of existence
really are different, their "laws" too will
be different. Whatever the mind's process
in struggling toward truth, experience
shows that most social progress has come
through cooperation, itself perhaps a kind
of harmonization-of-opposites, but still by
no means the total clash implied by Mar-
cuse. Moreover, the more one "descends"
to the practical world of politics and eco-
nomics, the more he finds many alterna-
tives, all standing over-and-against the
given to a certain extent, and yet all some-
what realizable. The relations are not a
matter of formal logic, with formal all-or-
nothing inclusions and exclusions, but ones
of practical compromise. Further, the as-
sumption that the "alternative" will neces-
sarily be "better" in the social order be-
cause it is "higher" in the conceptual order
is not borne out by experience. Certainly
Nazi Germany "radically negated" the
Weimar Republic that preceded it, but it
was not a "higher stage of history." Retro-
gression, stagnation, and gradual forward
progress-all hard to analogize to the pro-
cess of thinking-are social realities. So-
ciety is living, turbulent; its dynamisms are
not readily conceptualized by a metaphys-
ics of progress-by-negation. One is com-
pelled to wonder whether Marcuse is sub-
ject to the same critique he leveled at the
positivists: Is he a prisoner of his own
method?
Political Due Process and the
Rules of the Game
The cryptic phrase, "the rules of the
game," suggests what more elegantly may
be called "political due process." Its cen-
tral notion is the conviction that the
process of making public policy decisions
is more important than the given content
of any one particular decision itself, so
much more important, indeed, that on bal-
ance a polity will be better off even if it
should make the wrong decision the right
way than should it make the "right" de-
cision the wrong way. 10 9 Behind such a
paradox lie some judgments about man
and the nature of society which, inferen-
tially, Marcuse rejects. First, political due
process is flavored with a Humean skepti-
cism: for Mill, no one is infallible about
politics and economics; thus it is dangerous
to close off debate and freeze the current
doctrine or approach into permanent ac-
109 See Auerbach, The Communist Control Act
of 1954: A Proposed Legal-Political Theory of
Free Speech, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 173 (1956): "In
other words, because the democratic method of
settling conflict keeps open the avenue of change
so that wrongs may be righted peacefully, the
citizens of a democracy have a greater stake in
this method of settlement than in any particular
outcome of any particular conflict." Id. at 191.
Despite the application the cited article makes of
this principle, as a principle it should hardly be
controversial.
ceptance. 110 Not only is it quite possible
that some weakness in the policy has not
been considered, but it is practically cer-
tain that changed conditions in the future
will necessitate modification-and such
change will be highly difficult if not im-
possible if the spokesmen for potential
changes are silenced or if the channels of
effecting change-the decision-making pro-
cesses themselves-are closed. This skepti-
cism about certainty is not shared by Mar-
cuse, for whom the "radical alternative"
is the only "other" and is so clearly better
that anyone who opts for change within
the status quo lacks either good faith or
good sense, or has forfeited his right to a
voice in the making of policy because
technological domination has warped his
judgment.
Another judgment underpinning the
rules of the game: since no one is infal-
lible and yet decisions must be reached,
it follows that in political affairs only an
approximation of perfection can be at-
tempted. In other words, each decision
must be open-ended-subject to emenda-
tion-because human judgment is such that
no "totally right" or "eternally correct"
position can be taken. Consequently, the
possibility of correcting a given policy-de-
cision must always be built into that de-
cision itself."' Thus, the democratic
policy-maker is, as it were, always "dis-
tracted": he keeps one eye on the task at
hand, the issue presently being fought, but
110 J. MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 40, at 25:
"All silencing of discussion is an assumption of
infallibility."
111 See the comment of George Sabine at note 37
and accompanying text supra.
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he must keep the other on the method of
accomplishing that task, on the rules of
the fight. Besides the positive value in
such a dual concern-the chance of win-
ning the vote tomorrow that he loses today
-it also avoids a crucial negative result,
i.e., the substitution of naked force for
agreed-on standardized methods. For when
a given result is sought above all else,
above even the methods of realizing that
result, the classic ends/means problem of
social ethics becomes acute: partisans on
all sides of the issue are forced to act as if
the end justified the means-if only to sur-
vive.
However, if procedure be held in higher
esteem than the immediate, substantive re-
sult, it provides a common ground among
contesting factions, a basis of cooperation
when future power-shifts modify the roles
of the currently victorious and vanquished,
and a subtle facesaving device for the
loser, who can convince his followers that
he did all he could under the circum-
stances, i.e., under the rules. A political
leader's constituency, or his rivals within
the ranks who abide by rule-imposed re-
straints, will be much less demanding of
instant success than those who use power
as their only norm, and will impose on the
leader fewer pressures in a given case,
thus giving him time to maneuver through
peaceful channels. Moreover, by limiting
what the victors can do to the vanquished
by reprisals-both being under the rules
-defeat does not mean destruction for
any party. This is no trivial feat, consider-
ing the sham that is lawmaking in the
total dictatorship, where the substantive
goal of keeping power is infinitely more
important to the elitist power-holders than
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any "mere" procedure and where, conse-
quently, dissidents dare not criticize for
fear they will be deemed a threat to that
overriding goal's continual realization by
the infallible leadership. By disarming one's
adversary (and oneself) -permitting only
nonviolent means of effecting substantive
results-the commitment to procedural due
process in politics minimizes reliance on
force and violence by redirecting conflict
into calmer channels. It thus achieves a
"substantive result" far more profound and
far-reaching than any particular measure:
the civilizing of the contestants themselves.
Whatever the real weaknesses of some of
our present political procedures, to en-
shrine immediate result over long-range
process as all-important is retrogressive.
It enfeebles a civilized system at its very
heart and purpose: its ability to correct
mistakes nonviolently. Nevertheless, Mar-
cuse reverses the commitment to the in-
tegrity of the general procedure and insists
that substantive results are all-important.
Other Benefits of Political Due Process
Process is impersonal. Substantive "re-
sults" are usually personal: they are
blamed on or credited to individual per-
sons, and individual political leaders iden-
tify, in their people's minds and often in
their own, with the results. Commitment
to procedure over substance helps remind
those who share the commitment that the
Maximum Leader is not everything; it
helps remove "personality" somewhat from
the enterprise of governing, both by sub-
jecting the governor himself to rules even
he must obey, and by providing continuity
and permanence to a society which would
otherwise be stamped by the personality of
the Leader and even chronicle its past in
terms of "his" era, e.g., in Russia, the
"Stalin era." Then too, it enables those who
went before to contribute their own wis-
dom to the settling of affairs in the present,
at least to the extent that the forefathers
established the procedure which binds the
descendants and thus structures the manner
in which the latter will approach their
problems. Among many that could be ad-
duced, the separation of powers and the
method of constitutional amendment are
two outstanding examples of the Founding
Fathers' participation in our current gov-
ernance in the United States.1 2
Reverence for the rules of the game
makes change take longer. Sheer power
can effect changes by shortcut means that
"get the job done" no matter who is
trampled. It is true, of course, that undue
concern for the form of action, as the
common-law pleading demonstrated before
modern reforms, can be an obstacle to
attaining the just substantive result that
the forms were originally devised to facili-
112 I do not suggest that a procedure is good just
because it is old; but the reverse may be true, that
it is old just because it is good and has survived
the tests of time. One could hardly fault Holmes
for observing that it is "revolting to have no
better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV," Holmes,
The Path of the Law, reprinted in INTRODUCTION
TO LAW 50, 62 (1965), though there is great dif-
ference between a rule of law from medieval
England and a method of self-governance from
Federalist times. The modest purpose of the para-
graph accompanying this note is merely to suggest
a few ways that procedural due process helps
decision-makers to get a better perspective of the
immediate task at hand, by helping them some-
what transcend both personal ambitions and his-
torical myopia induced by the immediacy of their
specific problem, goal or crusade.
tate. But as long as there are openings for
justified change, as long as the channels
do at least reach the sea, then our im-
patience for instant upheaval-because our
side happens to have the power or the
image to carry all before it-is misplaced.
The orderly, step-by-step procedures retain
their importance: they admonish us that
in many instances government cannot en-
tirely right the wrongs it denounces, that
old practices have an inertia of their own,
that people cannot be "put in their place"
as one would arrange the papers on his
desk, that in the nature of things changes
may be rapid but improvements come
slowly, however hurried the improvers. 1 13
"The errors and defects of old establish-
ments are visible and palpable," wrote
Edmund Burke in 1790; "it calls for little
ability to point them out; and where ab-
solute power is given, it requires but a
word wholly to abolish the vice and the
establishment together. '114 To the objec-
tion that reform which preserves what is
good in the old order, while injecting
needed changes in what is evil, is too slow
and might take up many years, Burke
answered:
Without question it might; and it ought:
It is one of the excellencies of a method in
which time is amongst the assistants, that
its operation is slow, and in some cases
almost imperceptible .... Political arrange-
ment, as it is a work for social ends, is to
be only wrought by social means. There
113 Of course, even the most socialist of nations
will not satisfy Marcuse because it has not under-
gone the "qualitative" "transvaluation" he en-
visions.
114 E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION
IN FRANCE 238 (Regnery ed. 1962).
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mind must conspire with mind. Time is
required to produce that union of minds
which alone can produce all the good we
aim at. Our patience will achieve more than
our force."'
Finally, adherence to the rules of the
game reminds the players of the kind of
enterprise they are embarked on: the self-
governance of free men. If society is to
resemble a Spartan army, conceivably or-
ders can issue from the top to settle things,
though the average infantryman will be
unhappy and the intermediate officers will
grumble. But if society as a whole is to
be attuned to its members' needs, it must
provide opportunity for them to express
those needs. This mandates freedom of
speech: dialogue among the members and,
as Adolf Berle has observed, dialogue be-
tween the members and the power-
holder. 116 In today's society this multi-
faceted dialogue is at times slow and often
inconclusive; a number of reforms are
necessary. But frequent delay is no reason
to exchange a glacier, if such it be, for a
steamroller.
The Jurisprudence of Rule-Refusal
Marcuse teaches his followers to refuse
to play the game by the rules, contending
that any cooperation with the political
system is wrong. Behind such an uncom-
promising position lie two philosophical
premises. Marcuse never articulates them
specifically; rather they are implicit
throughout his writing on the method of
achieving radical social change in a demo-
115 Id. at 239.
116 A. BERLE, supra note 60, at 115-42.
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cratic society. First, a political movement
will be "tainted" even by procedural co-
operation with a society it would sub-
stantively change; second, substantive
goals and procedural means are so inter-
twined that one's adherence to certain
means will foreclose, perforce, the pos-
sibility of achieving some necessary re-
sults. I believe he is mistaken on the first
premise, but may well be correct on the
second. The questions deserve examination.
To ask whether the movement will be
tainted by operating within the forms of
democratic procedure is not to ask whether
it will succeed-for that is the second
question. Although the concern about
purity may befit a religious movement as
a matter of principle, it may not be ap-
propriate for a political movement. It will
not assist in achieving the designated goal.
Still, avoidance of contamination-through-
cooperation may be used as a defense
mechanism to insulate the neophyte from
having his faith shaken by outside con-
tact. It helps maintain his sense of isola-
tion (and often, resentment at isolation).
Without living, experiential contact with
that political system which he feels op-
presses him-except possibly in the dimen-
sion of police law-enforcement-he can
conjure up various visions of abuses, plots,
schemes that the Powers-"They"-are
planning, while remaining secure in his
negative faith that "the channels are
closed," that no means within the system
can effect change. Since the follower of
Marcuse wants to believe that American
legal and political processes do not work,
he does not want to encounter them work-
ing.
One of the great threats to the Mar-
cusean faith is that the communicant will
discover that many of the world's ills stem
not from some abstract entity called "the
System" but from individual misunder-
standings and pure human "cussedness."
Indiscriminate contact with the outside
world would reveal to him the twin facts
that any system can be oppressive if it is
abused, and that many persons in this sys-
tem are using its viable procedures to
improve it. The concern about "taint"
is, in some contexts, insurance against
second-thoughts; it is also an effective pro-
tection against encountering the actual com-
plexity of social life and political decision-
making. The person who "refuses his
service" to the status quo and so defines
himself as "outside the realm of law" even
before some actual conflict with legal
mechanisms is hardly likely to exercise
the patience needed in using legal forms to
accomplish social goals. Even, for example,
in such relatively simple decision-making
forums as a zoning board hearing or a
school board budget briefing, the demands
on a partisan are great; to learn the facts,
to prepare a case, to study the statute, to
consult with others, to attend the hearing
itself, to argue his point, and other chores
of a good advocate, all "take too long."
The self-defined "outlaw" prefers to dis-
guise his inexpertise by declaring the legal
forms inadequate, and "taint" those who
use them. His ignorance and impatience
have locked him into his own narrow a
priori outlook. Yet, a mere glance at re-
cent history, toward which he is often as
disdainful as he is toward political due
process, would serve to remind him how
unnecessary is this self-imposed isolation-
the history of the Socialist movement in
both Europe and the United States elo-
quently attests to the possibility of accept-
ing the democratic legal framework while
"keeping the Faith" in one's substantive
goals.
Secondly, a Marcusean radical cannot
cooperate with democratic forms because
they impede attainment of his substantive
goal.11 7 Insistence on set procedures, such
as affording the opposition an opportunity
to speak; voting on a given matter only
when a constitutional quorum is present;
obeying written laws until they are changed
by test-case court ruling or legislative ac-
tion; insisting that decisions (whether ju-
dicial or legislative) be made only after
notice, hearing, and opportunity to rebut;
insures a kind of balancing process
whereby extreme views are usually tem-
pered, what was of value in the past is
separated from the dross and preserved for
the future, and proponents of overturning
long-standing practice are forced to scru-
tinize their plans carefully and to justify
them in detail.11 s In terms of accomplish-
ing revolution, it may be that the "rules
of the game" are "rigged"-though the
term is unfairly pejorative-in favor of the
status quo, for they establish an apparatus
wherein persuasion, not violence, is (sup-
posed) to be the basic means toward
achieving power. Persuasion requires that
the speaker frame a convincing case, state
117 The fact that the democratic process pro-
vides for the redress of grievances and for legal
and lawful changes does not alter the illegality
inherent in an opposition to an institutionalized
democracy which halts the process of change at
the stage where it would destroy the existing
system.
LIBERATION 66.
118 E. BURKE, supra note 114, at 238-45.
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it to his constituency, and abide by their
decision on its merits. The rules also
require that he listen to their "feedback,"
field their questions, handle their criticisms,
and accord to competitors the same respect
he demands for himself. Finally, if he
would succeed, he must strike a responsive
chord in his audience either in terms of
their interests or their idealism. Although
the system rarely works as well as this
summary model would suggest, it does at
least force both candidate and elector to
articulate and to justify (often imperfectly
it is true) their desires. Reasons clash with
opposing reasons, and because few advo-
cates so dominate the debate that every-
one follows, some minds are changed but
some adhere to their original views. And
since most men have something they
would like to preserve and are wary of
trading a known present good for an un-
known future good-which they fear might
also be evil-it becomes, as a practical
matter, impossible for a revolutionary
operating within a parliamentary structure
to persuade a majority to follow his lead.
Finally, the revolutionary seeks a total
change, and, consistently, demands not
only total power to accomplish his end,
but also total freedom from the procedural
limitations imposed upon that power by
the parliamentary system. The abuse of
power being a hallmark of the twentieth
century, men are uneasy in the face of
such demands and, unless stirred by some
impending or recent cataclysm, a majority
is almost certain to choose a more "mod-
erate" program. The procedures provide
men with an opportunity to achieve change
without revolution-in some measure, the
best of both worlds. Thus, Marcuse cor-
rectly asserts that when these procedural
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structures, which encourage a non-revolu-
tionary result, are wedded to technological
affluence, the general populace simply does
not "see" the need for total upheaval. By
making evolution possible, the procedure
deepens their disinterest in revolution. The
result is success for a candidate or move-
ment which in comparison to the radical-
revolutionary is "conservative," though the
new program may be quite "radical" com-
pared to its own predecessor. 119 At root,
then, Marcuse's complaint about the "rules
of the game" is an admission that to play
the game means to lose it. He does not
consider the possibility that the loss may
be due not to bad rules but to bad coach-
ing.
The Assumption of Infallibility
In rejecting the "rules of the game,"
Marcuse implicitly rejects the reasons for
119 Not "truly" radical, of course, for those who
would "reject society as a whole." The kinds of
"progress in civilization" Marcuse approves are
stated in Repressive Tolerance at 107-08: "The
English civil wars, the French Revolution, the
Chinese and the Cuban Revolutions .. " Preter-
mitting the question whether these four instances
are truly analogous, it should be noted that the
verdict on the latter two is still to be rendered,
and in the judgment of some scholars the price of
"progress" has been terribly high. See, e.g., A.
BARNETT, COMMUNIST CHINA IN PERSPECTIVE
(1962):
The plastic surgery that the Communists have
been performing on Chinese society for over a
decade has been painful indeed for millions of
Chinese, in a psychic as well as a physical
sense. The price in terms of economic austerity,
overwork, rigid political control, and unprece-
dented regimentation has been extremely high.
The entire twelve-year period [1948-1960] has
been one of almost continuous struggle, ten-
sion, and uncertainty in China....
Id. at 40. It is easy to rhapsodize about a revolu-
tion one has not lived through.
them. He states, in effect, that the "alterna-
tive" which is "wholly other" is so im-
portant to achieve-now-that the process
of changing society gradually through open
debate is irrelevant. His view of what is
wrong with society and what must be done
to correct it is the only right one;120 his
view is in itself so cogent that if it were
not for the oppressive atmosphere of the
totally-administered society it would easily
command acceptance. But in the present
context, the game being rigged against
the radical analysis and prescription, the
people cannot really decide what is best
for them. On the assumption that "the
game" is rigged, the procedural protec-
tions sketched above are to be jettisoned
in return for an activist censorship board
which will protect people from whatever
is "repressive," including words that pro-
mote warfare instead of welfare, and even
thought that inhibits "liberation"-all as
defined by the Marcusean elite itself. At
the core of this extreme skepticism about
the possibility of free speech in modern
society is both Marcuse's puzzlement that
people do not seem to see the world as he
does and the assumption that therefore
they must be bereft of all critical faculties.
Thus, he ignores popular concern about the
role of the media,121 dismisses the in-
120 In an article generally sympathetic to much
of Marcuse's analysis (though opposed to his so-
lution), one writer compared his approach to the
dogmatic righteousness in the historical Church:
"The price of tolerance for the right and the true
is intolerance for the wrong and the false. (Cath-
olics have heard this before: 'error has no
rights.')" Callahan, supra note 4, at 380. This is
the best popular article I have seen on the ques-
tion of political due process in Marcuse.
121 Expressed at least as early as the publication
of W. LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 99
fluence of the radical press, and overlooks
the widespread political ferment that so
distinguished the 1960's. Eyes riveted on
the rocks ahead-"the whole .. .period
is one of clear and present danger' '1 22
he does not notice that the Ship of State
is veering onto a different course. For
Marcuse, the end-"liberation"--does jus-
tify the means-repression of opinion
which dissents from his own. The supposi-
tion, infallibility of his radical analysis, is
unstated but nevertheless necessary to the
argument; and the wisdom of those who
will decide who is nonprogressive, when
and how to "withdraw tolerance" from
them, and what opinions may be tolerated
is taken for granted. Finally, that the debate
will deteriorate to violence as final arbiter
is assured; since "repressive tolerance"
cannot occur in a society given to pro-
cedural due process, so the silencing of
wrong, i.e., non-liberating, opinions can-
not occur without destroying the structures
that encourage the marketplace of ideas,
and these structures are, in the final anal-
ysis, the same rules of the game that inhibit
violence. Marcuse does not flinch from
the logical conclusion.
"Liberating Violence"
For Marcuse, the ethical judgment on
the use of violence is based on factors
(1955): "For the modern media of mass commu-
nication do not lend themselves easily to a con-
frontation of opinions. The dialectical process for
finding truth works best when the same audience
hears all the sides of the disputation." Lippmann
was aware of the difficulty of giving a hearing to
"the alternative"; keeping in mind Mill's advocacy
of free speech as the necessary political method,
he offered recommendations far more realistic
than Marcuse's. The problem is also discussed in
A. BERLE, supra note 60, at 327-31.
122 Repressive Tolerance at 109.
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other than the violence itself, i.e., on who
does it and what is the result.
In terms of historical function, there is a
difference between revolutionary and reac-
tionary violence, between violence prac-
ticed by the oppressed and by the oppressors.
In terms of ethics, both forms of violence
are inhuman and evil-but since when is
history made in accordance with ethical
standards: To start applying them at the
point where the oppressed rebel against the
oppressors, the have-nots against the haves
is serving the cause of actual violence by
weakening the protest against it.123
Since violence is a feature of all existing
regimes-"even in the advanced centers of
civilization, violence actually prevails"-
and since law in today's society is institu-
tionalized violence, while it may be prudent
for the powerless to refrain from violence
in the face of the powerful, it is hardly
ethically necessary; nonviolence "is a ne-
cessity rather than a virtue."'1 24 Thus Mar-
cuse disdains the Gandhi-King type of non-
violent resistance movement.1 2 Granted
Marcuse's premises, his position is logical
enough; and as a tactician he does show
some feel for current political realities.
While admitting that the time is not ripe
for upheaval, he states that "resistance at
particular occasions, boycott, nonparticipa-
tion at the local and small-group level may
perhaps prepare the ground. ' 12 6 The ease
123 Id. at 108.
124 Id. at 102.
125 British scholar Maurice Cranston makes this
explicit judgment. See Cranston, supra note 87.
Along with Marcuse's writings he cites his lecture
promoting the "demystification of violence" at the
London Conference on the Dialectics of Libera-
tion in 1967. id. at 47.
126 Repressive Tolerance at 101. In Liberation,
he approves the stages of "enlightenment prior to
material change-a period of education ... which
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with which Marcuse recommends that his
youthful followers justify violent means
with the rightful ends they pursue is con-
sistent with his premises. But the life of
society is not merely logic. When one con-
trasts the violence of the modern revolu-
tionary with the so-called "violence" Mar-
cuse attributes to society under the rule
of law, he wonders, once again, whether
we have an instance of misplaced analogy,
of Marcuse's personal lack of experience
with law as a nonviolent means of conflict-
resolution, 27 or perhaps, simply a lack of
adequate reflection on the relation between
creativity and violence.
Power is ethically neutral: it can be
good or evil, applied in good or evil ways,
for good or evil ends. For power to be
creative or liberative, it must be applied
rationally; yet violence is irrational. Crea-
tivity follows and uses natural patterns, as
the composer of a symphony works within
the necessities of harmony, as the poet
obeys the commands of rhythm and rhyme.
But violence is random; it shatters natural
patterns. It is the axe swung into the com-
poser's piano, the ink smeared over a poet's
manuscript, the grenade tossed into a shop
in Saigon or Tel Aviv. Creativity is a
thousand years of culture accumulating at
Dresden or Monte Cassino; violence is a
night bombing-raid that sweeps it all away,
leaving only pock-marked earth, smoking
rubble, and crippled children with tears
in their eyes. In itself, violence cannot
create, for it is power used irrationally.
But indirectly, the selective, rational ap-
turns into praxis: demonstrations, confrontation,
rebellion." LIBERATION 53.
127 Cf. H. BERMAN & W. GREINER, THE NATURE
AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW pts. 1 & 4 (1966),
plication of certain kinds of power can
be a creative force. The surgeon's scalpel,
the parent's measured discipline of his
child, court orders carefully drawn to
achieve a specific result-these and hun-
dreds of other examples demonstrate that
the threat or actual use of measured force
for a rightful purpose and (especially with
regard to law) within prescribed clearly
understood rules of general application is
ubiquitous in human affairs and is essen-
tial for a rational society.
But there is an infinite difference be-
tween the measured force the law brings
to bear and the indiscriminate violence of
the revolutionary. The law deals with in-
dividuals, struggling to maintain reason,
and making careful distinctions-e.g.,
among accident, negligence, intentional
tort, strict liability; between murder and
the degrees of manslaughter; between sub-
stantial and incidental contract violations,
and in some jurisdictions even between
comparative degrees of negligence. The
revolutionary, as prosecutor, judge and
executioner-of a predetermined, indis-
criminate sentence against a whole class of
people-has no time to make rational
distinctions. How can a Molotov cocktail
hurled at a draft board or a bomb planted
in a New York skyscraper avoid the in-
nocent and harm only the guilty? When a
judge signs an injunction prohibiting so-
cially damaging conduct, he specifies
clearly, in detail and at great length, after
a fair hearing to determine facts, what
cannot be done; when a revolutionary
would "enjoin" his less enlightened brethren
from conduct not approved by him, he sets
up barricades or throws rocks. Just how
close to barbarism men are, when they fail
to distinguish between rational force and
random violence, when they begin to
rhapsodize about "creative violence" or
"violence as the midwife of a new society,"
has been strikingly illustrated in the con-
duct of the famous dictators of our troubled
era.128 But Marcuse neither adverts to
these theoretical distinctions nor seems to
remember the historical examples. In his
concern to bring about a better world even
if the price be violence, Marcuse is a man
of great hope; yet "there is often a mon-
strous incongruity between the hopes, how-
ever noble and tender, and the actions
which follow them. It is as if ivied maidens
and garlanded youths were to herald the
four horsemen of the apocalypse.' 1 29
Conclusion
The foregoing pages have described two
different spiritual universes. I fear the gap
between them is unbridgeable. Building
that bridge would be only an academic
exercise if Marcuse were just another
academic. But he has had hundreds of
readers and thousands of followers, doubt-
less among them some of the best intellects
the present generation can boast, most of
them quite enthusiastic about their vague
128 See W. SHIRER, supra note 106, especially
sections on the "Roehm Purge" and the concen-
tration camps; R. CONQUEST, supra note 106. As
for Lenin, see D. SHUB, LENIN 156-57 (1953),
describing the execution of fifteen hundred polit-
ical prisoners by his Secret Police Chief, Dzer-
zhinsky, who "misunderstood" Lenin's orders.
129 E. HOFFER, THE TRUE BELIEVER 20 (1951).
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goal of "liberation" and a good many quite
committed-or at least resigned-to the
"necessity" of violence to achieve it. Thus,
they challenge those who would defend
the tradition of reasonableness in human
affairs to defend it by reasons which will
convince the doubters. Those who accept
the tradition of reason must demonstrate
the harm that will befall society should it
follow Marcuse's prescriptions, and must
prove the continued viability of the tradi-
tion of Burke and Mill, and not the Jaco-
bins; of Locke and the Federalists, and
not the Encyclopedists; of America's his-
torical experience, and not Hegel's histori-
cal abstractions. The violence already per-
vading this society and decried by Marcuse
attests both to the failure, in some measure,
of the tradition of free debate and to the
continued widespread presence of the arbi-
trary in human affairs. Such an ill can be
cured gradually, but not by the alternate
kind of violence Marcuse urges. As the
American Civil Liberties Union has aptly
observed:
To abandon the democratic process in the
interests of "good causes" is to risk the de-
struction of freedom not just for the pres-
ent but for the future, not just for our
social order but for any future social order
as well. Freedom, the world has learned to
its sorrow, is a fragile plant that must be
protected and cultivated.)
130 American Civil Liberties Union, Statement
on Campus Disorders, at 2 (1969) (mimeo).
